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'l:F c:olJRT OF THE STATE GF UTAH 
\,?SP f!o. 19r)F.S 
GPfendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF ':•F APPELLAIH 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
rhe appellant, JAY RICHARD NEWTON, appeals from a convic-
Judument of Aygravated Robbery, a felony of the 
:e•1ree. in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Dennis Frederick, 
presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, JAY RICHARD NEWTON, was charged with Aggra-
,ated Robbery, a felony of the First Degree in violation of 
'1tle 76, Chapter 6, Section 302, Utah Code Annotated, (1953 
amended). Appellant was convicted as charged in a jury trial 
was sentenced to incarceration at the Utah State Prison 
c>Jr;uanl to Title 76, Chapter 3, Secti.on 402, Utah Code Annotated, 
l ,. · .. is amended I, for the indeterminate term as provided by 
_•r -1 t>'-'lonv nt t-.he F1rst Degree. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
il1e ,-imwl lnnt sPeks to have the conviction and judgment 
·1 I· r tw 1 o,,, revF>rsed and to have the case remanded to the 
11 l ;iJ,111·1,-il D1'-:>tr1ct Court for a ne1N trial. 
,,, 1 
'Ii l t) 1 <! (I rl 1-'., j' ) 1_1 I' ,_,l ,1 
7- ,,_, , c-, r -1 
rn1-, 
dv'_;S lo.:_e;r ,111J. ,::t j ,l ( ,_, •1 t <i l ,() .;':-'<::::I< .. -:> •tl 1: _ r 
the robbery 1 r. ll-J ,;_ 1. un tne second 0cass1on Ms. 
ident1f1ed a photograph of the appellant as the person who had 
comfTl l tted the r onh,c:.r·/ l l. l (. -14 J. A nurnbf?r cit rir'=''J1011s 
identifications by· Ms. Shepard preceded her in-court identifi-
cation at trial (T. 11, 30). 
THE TRIAL COURT PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
RE FUS IfJG Fi G I'.1E THE APPELLAtJT' S REO\JESTE:> 
LISTRUCTIOl"JS C;Il THE llATURE CJF REQUIREnEIJfS 
FOR EYDiITl"JESS IDErlTIFIC.l'\TIDl"J E'!IDEMCE. 
The defense raised at trial was that the appellant was 
not the person who committed the aggravated robbery which was 
alleged in the Information. The testimony of Ms. Shepard in 
this particular case left grave doubts about the adequacy of 
her identification. She characterizes her initial description 
to the police as "very sketchy" (T. 24). She further says that 
she did not observe very much and that she was not that well 
trained in giving descriptions of people IT. 24); could not 
I." I·· 
as being S'4" or c;•=," and 1411 prnmds 1 r. 
his actual height ls i ncfH-"'S t .. JJ i •'r' n1d 111 ,·JP l • 1 rit ._11 r·n1Jf1(1'""' 
heavier than the in1t-1al 1 t._-' (' r· l t ·l l. :fit• I fll I i I l•·nt · 1 t -;. r'r 
made of the appel L.mt U'/ ·I-;. 1 it I , ''I' ;r II 
<• 1, ,11• t 1 f',P..J ·nt.:ek.::; aft-er the incident. As a part of his 
t-, 
J, · t •"r1.=:i1::: 
Tns..._ rue-I: ions pro'11rled: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
1)rw of the most important issues in this case is the iden-
·'" .• t,.c,n of thco defer,dant as tl".e perpetrator of the crime. 
1=::.'2 t, __ i::c!er. ':)f pr0?ing irJenti ty beyor.d a reasonable 
cubt. It is not essential that the witness himself be free 
'•on doubt as to the correctness of his statement. However, 
the Jury, must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of 
··,"' of the ic:lentification of the defendant before you 
-,., him. If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable 
:r.1mt that the defendant '"as the person ·,1ho committed the crime, 
;0u must tind the defendant not guilty. 
Identification testimony is an expression of belief or 
·•pression by the witness. Its value depends on the opportunity 
·ne "1itness had to observe the offender at the time of the of-
and to make a reliable identification later. 
In appraising the identification testimony of a witness 
;au should consider the following: 
1. Are you convinced that the witness had the capacity 
an adequate opportunity to observe the offender? 
Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to observe 
thC' off ender at the time of the offense will be affected by 
-·:<·h matters as how long or short a time was available, how 
'"' "' close the witness was, how good were lighting conditions, 
ii»· r h'c' r the witness had had occasion to see or know the person 
1 •:i past. 
In F'ner.11 , a '.-JJ tnPss bases any identification he makes 
I" 1 ·eopt 1.m through the use of his senses, Usually the 
'"' 1.ient 1 fies an offender hy the sense of sight - but this 
11e>····ss.'lrilv so, and he may use other senses). 
Are :;ou sat1sf1ed that the identification made by the 
·•uhc;P<jUPnt to the offense \'1as the product of his own 
, ""t, ut1' '{"u rnav take into account both the strength of 
, 1 t ""1+-1nn, a;1 c1 the circumstances under •;1hich the identi-
1 ()ft ')d,--, 11,J,it_•. 
,,, Jc•nt1t 11·1t10n by the v1itness may have been influ-
dnc·es unrler cvh1ch the defendant was pre-1 l1, 
(Footnote No. 1 continued! 
sent.:::d t-n r1:n1 
fication '11i th 
f r_)t , 1 ff-_-, it"-
of t1;-r,e that 1-a.I.J'-.c-d L1--, ·i-':·11 
thE- n'=';,t ,;, 
nn rPl l 
l ! t ! '::- l ll' ,_ 
(You rnav ,--_.:lso r·,"Jkt'::' lr-;trJ .-j( l-(•lir,t-
rna·--:le b-.,, p1.--;(J +-i.-,,:-, -,1-J ,t -·i-
dual:s i.S { ,o:_. 1''::::::i_lal.le ':l'lcll1 
the presentaticn of tl1e ,iefcndant alone to 
I : r ] [ : (- \ 
1< r t-h0 l 1:0.nqt-
1 [,,, r_'l'lJ'I•' lf 
1 t 1r1t, --i r 
;:l l l 1•(f-.2.ri1 I t 1 t-',j_ t l (·Jn 
I: 
·,f,J..-:..·11 c1-...:::::iulLs icor11 
tr.e ·:.11 tnc::ss. 
3. (You may take into account any occasions in which the 
witness failed to make an identification of defendant, or made 
an identification that was inconsistent with his identification 
at trial. 1 
4. Finally, you must consider the credibility of each 
identif:;_.,:u.t_l__Gn :Ji tnes.s _ul. the setme ,·iCJ.y as a11y oLher ,,, l t11ess, 
consider whether he is truthful, and consider whether he had 
the capacity and opportunity to make a reliable observation 
on the matter covered in n1s testimony. 
The burden of proof on the State extends to every element 
of the crime charged, and this specifically includes the burden 
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the 
as the perpetrator of the crime with which he stands charged. 
If after examining the testimony, you have a reasonable doubt 
as to the accuracy of the identification, you must find the 
defendant not guilty. (R 95-96) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
One of the most important issues of this case is the ident1fc 
cation of the defendant, JAY RICHARD NEWTON. The State has 
the burden of proving identity beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Identification testimony is an expression of belief or 
impression by the witness. In this case, some of the witnesses 
have testified that they recognized the defendant as a partici-
pant in the crime. You must decide whether there is a reason-
able doubt in this identification. In appraising the identi-
fication testimony of the witnesses you should consider the 
following: 
1. Did the witnesses have the capacity and opportunity 
to observe the offender. 
2. Is the identificat10ri made bv the ''"1tnPss a product 
of his own recollection. 
3. Has the 1'1itness been consistent in rPCO<}n1z1nq the 
defendant as a participant in the offense. 
If after considering thesP factors vnu have a reasonable 
doubt as to the accuracy of the 1dent1f1rat1nn, you must f:nd 
the defendant not guilty. !R. ·p: 
'r '"' •_uurt r·efused to give the instruction and exception 
'lf i ·n. lnt1f:-'rr:::.1-:t- -1 r: "'?.'/E:',il tn>?ss identification evidence 
f'r · i "-
- f In ,-:in 0ft-
Jur L ,Justice observed: 
·rhat is the worth of identification testimony 
even when uncontradicted? The identification 
of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy. 
The hazards of such testimony are established 
b'i 3 formidable numbpr of instances in the 
_·(:":,cd_.; ::,,f a.nu Ainerican trials. fhese 
instances are recent - - not due to the bru-
tal 1 ties oi ancient criminal procedure. 
EJidence as to identity based on personal 
impressions, however bona fide, is perhaps 
of all classes of evidence the least to be 
relied upon, and therefore, unless supported 
by other facts, an unsafe basis for the verdict 
of a Jury. Frankfurter, The Trial of Sacco 
and Vanzetti. 
The unreliability of eyewitness identification has been 
documented in the literature, and numerous law review 
ir•1:les have been written on the subject in recent years. 2 
Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony 
-,, the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 Stan.L. 
RP;, 'J69 ( 1977); Due Process Standards for the Admissibility 
:f Fyew1tness Identification Evidence, 26 Kan. L. Rev. 461 (1978); 
Identification Evidence: Flaws and Defenses, 7 No. 
' Rev. 407 (1980); Ellis, Davies, Shepherd, Experimental 
,,·J1»s of Face Identification 3 Nat. J. Crim. Def. 219 (1977); 
'p ·f Eyewitness Identification Evidence in Criminal Trials, 
... '). --..1 11•1- 111. Loftus, Eye•tJitness Testimony (1979); 
:·1.-1-ccnder Sourcebook, pp. 251-57 (S. Singer, ed. 1976); 
- 1 • ll1e Psychology of Eyewitness (1979); Buckhout, 
of Eyewitness Performance on a Lineup, 1974 Bull. 
'" nurntr· :Soc 'y 191; Buckhout, Eyewitness Identification and 
irr•i"JY in the Courtroom, Crim. Def., Sept. -Oct. 1977, 
1'.rt.-khr-iut, Eyew1 tness Testimony, Scientific Am.,_ Dec. 
Fll 1s, Daviess Shepherd, Experimental Studies of 
The commentators note that reasons tot- tl11s 1mrPl1cir)1[1tv cirp 
and memory, bot-h of lr'h ;_, J l ! it ; fl f-''/' ·':! 
s 
memory which are associated with hearsav test1monv. 
to those issues the author noted: 
At a basic level, perception is determined by 
objective structur3l fFlctors surh cis thP narur= 
of the stimulus, the 1m.pact of the stimulus rin 
tiie sense organs according to various physical 
laws, the operation of the afferent neural 
pathways from the sense organs to the brain, 
and the cortical prOJPction 0r rPronstr11ctinn 
of the stimulus. However the neuroloaical 
system operates to transduce physical energy 
into a sensation, it is clear that interpreta-
tion is required to transform sensation into 
meaning. 
In organizing raw sensory input, the central 
nervous system is not a photographic recorder. 
Injury, pathology, drugs, youth, and 
senility can seriously impair the accuracy of 
these processes. 1970 Utah Law Rev. at 9. 
1 j, 
In United States v. Barber, 412 F.2d 517 (3rd Cir. 1971), 
the court gave a similar description of the processes involved 
in human observation, perception and memory. It then 1rJent on 
to state, with respect to eyewitness identification, 
2. (continued) Face Ident1f1,ca• ,,-,n. tlc,t 'I ,·r:rn. 21·1 
(1977); Levine & Tapp, The Psycholoqy of Cr1m1nal IdPnt1f1cat1on: 
The Gap from to Kirby, 121 U. Pa. L. Re•;. 1070 I 1·r-,1; 
Luce, The Neglected Dimension in Evewitness Ident1f1rat1on, 
Crim. Def., May-June l'J77, at :i-8; Tyrrell Cunn1nqham, 
'rJitness Credibility: AdJ11sting the S1ahts •Jf the Judir1arv, 
37 Ala. Law. 56'3, 575-58 (]'rFI. 
3. Stewart, Perception, Memory Jnd He>,c1r·-1,1·/: 
Present Law and the Pr0posed t--0 ,J•"tdl nui·· -.1 
Utah Law Rev. l. 
,; 1 r : t i (-, l rn ,-) 1 
I 'j l 'lf'ri':·1 >' I f ·, 
,; .-::.s ldr.:nt L.t icat1on testimony, therefore, 
(·xpr0ss1on a belief or impression by 
r ' I 1- : 1 1_:. ,_- S , T +- t l (:' r ":' l S Cl h i h rj e e 0 f 
[1r'-"'r·1·:-;1on =inu Cl?rtalnty ln h1s expression, 
:::_:._-:;' 
1.'-'.1 an> .staternents 
<n'r ·::n r-:-:·ss-r::::-:am1n2t;_2-r., the staterr.er..t 
+- f1F? ··1 t-rv-'>c;s rnn'/ be rP<Jarder! ci.s a 
l I l_ .=> 1 'r, _ul -I , r· Y:t=:: 1:;;;..:. -
,-;1,r,,11 t_,:i pus_;es.s an •2videntiar:; 
j JI i r '·1 ··1f - r"'.: ·-=:-ru:Jr rc=inV:. -;-·nus, 1,\rfv::::r<:: the 
'";r':--,1 '311r r:rirnlnal act 
VP opportunity for observation or 
-:if ti-1c .:;211::.ur_; pcccepticn, or 
uncertainty is expressed by the witness 
himself, or exposed by a past history of the 
witness' statements or demonstrated by cross-
_.: . J:T.:.nation, st.J.t:2r,-:ent of ider1tit·; should 
s -i"":· ;'Jr! ,=is tJn J ·; .::in ·'?:.<.press i -Jn of op inion 
and should be accompanied by appropriate in-
structions as its sufficiPncy and weight. 
To be sure, the courts have been generous in 
admission ·Jf identification in 
to its assess-
ment. The emphasis has been on inclusion of 
evidence rather than exclusion; on credibility 
rather than admissibility. [footnotes omitted] 
4l2 F.2d at 
In tins case, the initial identification was that of the 
-rrPllant's photograph being picked out of a group of six pie-
.. 'Jr":'s. This identification did not occur until one to two weeks 
"ft.er the robbery occurred. In Simmons v. United States, 390 
.. 5. 377 (1968), the United States Supreme Court addressed the 
ue of whether a photographic array was impermissibly suggestive 
·n,Jlation of the petitioner's right to Due Process of Law. 
tci 1 so, the court discussed the dangers associated with 
'''->e rd photographic identifications, stating, 
I' must te that improper employment 
-·t photoyrHphs Gy police may sometimes cause 
to err in identifying criminals. A 
1tness may havP obtained only a brief glimpse 
•t 1 ··r1rn1nal, or may have seen him under poor 
cond1t1ons. Even lf tl!r:i f,-_,J1, 1[ '- ( '•---!llt--'t-lt l '/ 
f'Jl l'l':f t-h0 IT'0C::.L ,...,,,l'Y'(-"r-·t- l t' I : ( 
l "n r r·'':: 
0f 'r,11 '/1,111.i l..., · t-r1 11+-
1,-1ilurn i-f t : '.=:> -,ur;1(· 
+_,_:: t!,·: ·-.-1· ',1; 
of u s1_n:1lP 1n,J1 · ... fi 1 ' 1l1 
cut'es 01- se 11er a.l t-Jr-:rs0ns 3JTICL\j ,,,t11c.11 µ;10Lc)--
qraph of sinJ:c such r-0cur-s ·=r 13 
in some way emphasized. [footnote omitted] 390 
U.S. at 383. 
The Supreme Court of Kansas, in State v. Warren. 635 P.2d 
.L '-" _; 3 c 
evidence. The court then took note of the prohlems 
that arise in the courtroom with that evidence. 
In spite of the great volume of articlps on 
the subject of eyewitness testimony by legal 
writers and the great deal of scientific research 
by psychologists in recent years, the courts in 
this country have been slow to take the problem 
seriously and, until recently, have not taken 
effective steps to confront it. The trouble is 
that many judges have assumed that an "eyeball" 
witness, who identifies the accused as the 
criminal, is the most reliable of witnesses, 
and, if there are any questions about the identi-
fication, the jurors, in their wisdom, are fully 
capable of determining the cred1bility of the 
witness without special instructions from the 
court. Yet cases of mistaken identification 
are not infrequent and the problem of misidenti-
fication has not been alleviated. 
'v'Je note, for example, a l 'j/q unreported prose-
cution in Wilmington, Delawar0, against Rev. 
Bernar-j P,1.c_Janc1, ,_-:t r'';ff.tr', --..c_1'rr1c'l _,_, r-)l'' ,_,,;t, 
accused of robbing six De 10·,r;H·e stores 1 n the 
winter of 1978. At the trial, he was falsely 
identified by several state witnesses as the 
robber. After the State rPsterl its the 
-'i-
f 1 ,__.., dl.::.111_]_:::;,SeJ on mot-lon of the State 
t ,, ·,-tu::::,r--' dnur:her man confessed to the crime. 
·1 1 !::-.er t,() l1nme is rhe case of Ronald Quick, who 
,...:., tr> -"11d cif aggr3. 1/at"=d 
,hLt-=>1 / ci l 1Cluor .store l n Hi1trhj_nson. A.t 
'1 Tr_:1ls t·1v c-y.-:'1JJ_;-r1t?sse:-.i positively identified 
!c11t t-l!t_' of the crime. 
t :,.... rt--; ,.....,r:c; ··,1Prc '.P''"'?rsi::d for tr1 ::11 
_;_1i_ --:r,· 22c-. t<:an. 308, S'J/ P.2d 
I l dl1l1 22 1:1 KC>l). li'' h21 p' 2rl qg" 
''·, · ls r: ':1 0::; d 1 s r:: -;_ s s e c-2 b r the e 
,___.{·L- '1"::::: t::1t.J trL._.:i:;_ dfter ei.noi:her man, 
].,nked live the defendant, confessed to the 
crime. 
The Kansas procedure does provide certain safe-
guards to prevent the conviction of an innocent 
r=i.r_·(_IJ'.::if:'U on the basis of unreliable eye1,'l!itness 
1,-·..--,•-. t:r::.32._ have t::--:e j:o·,;ec 
to suppress eyewitness testimony, if the eye-
identification procedure rendered the 
testimony unreliable. Cross-examination and 
ai·gument by defense counsel afford some protec-
t ..._un. l.;11ioctuna ce.iy, chese procedures have not 
solved the problem. Able defense counsel have 
attempted to combat unreliable eyewitness iden-
t if icat1on by two additional methods: They have 
called to the witness stand expert witnesses in 
the field of psychology to testify as to the 
various factors which may cause eyewitness 
identification to be unreliable. They have 
also requested the trial court to give a cau-
tionary instruction stating the factors to be 
considered by the JUry in weighing the credi-
bility of eyewitness testimony. 635 P.2d at 
1241. 
'.r, t.hat case, the trial court refused to allow the defense to 
of these actions. Elizabeth Loftus, an expert on 
1tness identification was not allowed to testify and the 
.rt r·efused to give the same or a similar instruction asap-
11 1 1 r-µquested 1n this case.
4 After a lengthy discussion 
t 0xpert testimony to solve the problems associated 
> 11, itness testimony the Kansas court stated, 
frJutnute l, supra. 
__ q_ 
Atter ccns1cier1ng t-hPSt-_' r,-lSPS ,=n1·l t rv' l 1 t-r't'-1t-11r .. · 
on the subject, ':Je have c'oncl'l·h"d th.'ll re4uic1nu 
tri.al c-nurts t-(' l lm' t t_h1·-; +-','i-,- >Vi'" rt- CC"jj -
,j . .1 :1 !-1'.:'t it __ ir1_:; • [,. /'t ; 1 
a pr0p2r csi_:ti,.Jnacv 
v1h1ch sets the fc:::1ct:,·_)rs t, l·r_; 
I I ' 
· '_1i ;_-::; 1 , l r· ,_,,_j 
1-11.Stru\_::-c ::i_,)11, ,, l 7-n </-1 er JSS-
e:v21T1:'...na1:inn -::1-':i· :_,.,, ,] ,C 
,.i, th1.._• 
comings should protect the of the defen-
dant and at +-he same time thP c01_1r+-s 
to avoid the problems involved in the admission 
of expert testimony on this subject. 635 P.2d 
at 1243. 
The -instruction that the Kansds r:c11rt h::>lt..-1 sho1tJ'i t-:e 11',P!", 
was that framed by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia in United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 
552 (D.C. Cir., 1972) 0 The Telfaire court described the need 
for such an instruction, stating, 
The presumption of innocence that safeguards 
the common law system must be a premise that is 
realized in instruction and not merely a 
promise. In pursuance of that objective, we have 
pointed out the importance of and need for a 
special instruction on the key issue of identi-
fication, which emphasizes to the jury the need 
for finding that the circumstances of the 
identification are convincing beyond a reason-
able doubt. This need was voiced in 1942 1n 
McKenzie v. United States, [112 F.2d 533] and 
it has been given vitality in our opinions of 
recent years - - - following the Supreme 
Court's 1966 Wade-Gilbert [v. California, 388 
U.S. 263, 87 St. Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 
(1967)] Stovall [v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293] trilogy 
focusing on the very real danger of mistaken 
identification as a threat to Justice. We rPfer 
to our post-Wade opinons in Gregory [v. IJn1terl 
States, 4, F.2d 1-L+ upJn1•_1r1:-; 
sought to take into account the traditional 
5. This same instruction •rias citPd .Htli Cippr'oval hy Justice 
Stewart in his dissPnt1ng 0pu11on in ':itiet•' ·;. 'lalfl'r·•Jc;P, 
P.2d 56 at 63 (Utah lq821 and ·10" .'Jlt"'rn.1t1·1P]'/ rP•11J0st•'d bv 
appellant in this casP. 
that identification testimony pre-
r;- P· il protler1s cf reliability by stress-
U,e "mpoctance •:Jf an ldtcnt1fication lilStruc-
J.n th.:_. ,_::c_;nStJ.l::11t:innal 
-:>hold ,:;f adm1s:-sib1litT/. [footnotes 
.r:11 tte.J j f. 2d at '5'56. 
'"' -·r -:J.! dea]in<J •,11+-h an idPnt1f1c::ti0n defense. 6 
'•w K::msas court required the Telfarie instruction be given, 
! r · 1 , 
Tl1P •Jeneral instruction given in that case provided: 
IrlSTRUCTIOM fl(). 
"It i c; fol" you to detet"mine the •.-1eight and ct"edi t to be 
•Pn the testimony of each witness. You have a right to use 
""" knoviledge and experience ·which you possess in common with 
· ·r, in general in considering the testimony of each witness. 
-'or1 ;cilso may take the following factors into consideration when 
a •witness' testimony: 
la) The witness' ability and opportunity to observe and 
cnow the things about which he had testified; 
lb) The clarity and accuracy of the witness' memory; 
1r1 The witness' manner and conduct while testifying; 
Id) Any interest the witness may have in the result of 
r 1il1, 
I 1-... 
fhe t"easonableness of the witness' testimony when 
in light of the evidence in the case; and 
·,,,,,, l'c1rJs, intet"est, pt"eJud1ce or motive the witness 
: t ·;n11 find that any witness has willfully testified 
J·; r_irH.:·f'rn1ng any material matter, you have a right to 
.,,,t thP tPst1mony of that witness in other matters, and 
11.1 1 ; 1 ,-. : Pr·t ., l l or part of the testimony of that witness, 
11 1r.1·; ·i1·;p it such vtJe1ght as you think it deserves. You 
.[.J 1"'' r···ipr·t any testimony ·.v1thout cause." 635 P.2d at 
-11-
:!lie have cons1dec1:::''J the t,1( t t 11,it- t r·1c:l 
courts arc often rec;uLre·l L· d,-,1 t_•l '11 l t1<-' 
t-. ad::1iss1b1 t--,, ,"Jf ·'1':.. 1".' 
issues of ln 
J ,; 
l i ab ;_ l .:. -+=: - • " f i --J ,'=' r. +- L : -· ,-1 t i . 'r 1 t . 
'tl :).,i i-', ,-1, --------------
_;__·, ' l - ,_. r 
If ul _i b(-::: ·,-:.ir1-
s1dr:c:red :n t-(--; 
::est .\--- «:culd _-, i ,= 1 1- .-:t. 
require the Jury to consj_der the fa1-=-tors 
in ·.-Je1yhi11g tile credlU1-1-lty ur -che 
identification testimony. Otherwise the Jury 
might reasonably conclude that the admission 
of the evidence by the trial court vouched for 
..Lts .:it:> ti1ir:Y.. it t'ler-:it· L-!1rit 1 
standards must be provided the jury so that the 
credibility of testi-
mony can be intelligently and fairly weighed. 
The t_J1·,;irHJ 1)f such an instruction '.·.rill taKe 
cr,ly a 11.l11utes J.ll cc1al c1i11e dllci v11.il 
be well v10rth it, if some future inJustices can 
be avoided. 635 P.2d at 1244. 
[Emphasis by court] 
In rJeil ·v. Bigoers, supra, the United States Supreme Court 
was addressing the issue of the admissibility of eyewitness 
identification evidence based on a showup procedure.
7 
In 
determining the admissibility of the evidence the court initi-
ally noted that you must consider the totality of the circum-
stances. 
stating, 
The court then listed several factors to consider, 
As indicated by our cases, the factors to be 
considered in evaluating the likelihood of mis-
identification include the opportunity of the 
witness to view the criminal at the time nf the 
crime, the ,ie(1rP,.:; rif :::1ttent;_,--,n, thr--? 
accuracy of the •:11t:ness' prior ·iescr1pt1on ut 
the criminal, the level of CPrta Lnl y demonst:r.·ited 
by the witness at the confrontation, and the 
length of time between the crime and the con-
frontation. 490 U.S. at 199. 
7. That procedure lnvol·;prj +-'.-Jr) i1-·>t-,_,,-.t1·/F''.--, ;J,1lk:rirJ thP r•f-'t-J 1-1 1Jnt'r 
past a rape victim. 
- I . -
hove considered the fact that trial 
, ,,,, rs -H'"' 1Jft-F>n reou1red to deterr:nne the 
_____ 'Jf test1::ic_,n'/ ',.;ner-?. 
')f in State ·,I. Ponds, 22: 
,\:,111. • 1!·-, P.l-d 94rJ, in testing the re-
-1t l t-·/ 1:Jf 1:est1mony, the fl"-.le 
--,1-- ,,+- 1 -(-.:.,i 'r1 "I,_-, 1 1 (_.')r; :; . S, 
by the tr·ial 
1 l11r· r i tl1P'::P t 1 '/P sh0uld b<7 c0n-
J.--r c... ! ,J.·-t .. y·"L:-'l!J] · t:--.e 
1-t-.. 1ou.iU se'2m even more appropriaLe to 
the JUry to conslder the same factors 
1n weighing tne credibility of the eyewitness 
identification testimony. Otherwise the jury 
might reasonably conclude that the admission 
of the evjdence by the trial court vouched for 
1ts r?11An1lit·;. think it clear that, in 
s0m2 
standards must be provided the jury so that the 
2red1bil1ty of eyewitness identification testi-
mony can be intelligently and fairly weiqhed. 
fhe giv:ng of such an instruction will 
cniy a couple or minutes in trial time and ,,,nll 
be well worth it, if some future injustices can 
be avoided. P.2d at 1244. 
[Emphasis by court] 
In ile i l v. Biggers, supra, the United States Supreme Court 
'rls addressing the issue of the admissibility of eyewitness 
evidence based on a showup procedure. 7 In 
;eLermining the admissibility of the evidence the court initi-
illy noted that you must consider the totality of the circum-
,J.nr,_::,s. The court then listed several factors to consider, 
As indicated by our cases, the factors to be 
considered in evaluating the likelihood of mis-
identification include the opportunity of the 
witness to view the criminal at the time of the 
'r1mP, the ntness' degree of attention, the 
-,crurac; of the 'l'ii tness' prior description of 
the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated 
hv t-he witness at the confrontation, and the 
IPnuth nf time between the crime and the con-
tr0ntation. 490 U.S. at 199. 
!I i" 1-,,, ,,·pi'J\Jt'P involved t'/'JO detectives walking the petitioner 
1 r q : m. 
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Previously, this c(_)uct f'L:J.d ,}1_:(_·1d•'•i t!1,1t · , 1 r 1•) t t '!-_' '1 ,_-,rs 1 l 
error tei 'Ji 11: r 11 + '' 1 I I 1 1 
'./a r- r ,, n ' --:; r :- ,=: ' _,._,_· ________ _ 
It i_s i_ntert?st t-o t -, t '1 i c, ,-, h' j t t •' ,_;:, Jfl j,-4 ' 
·---------------
nc.it Lr: ')111 
struct1ons on credibility and burden of proof were given, the 
the court noted that there were two eyewitnesses who had abun-
dant opportunity to observe the defendant, thus alleviating 
an'.,' 
the instruction did not constitute "reversible error" [emphasis 
added] 6:8 P.2d at 118-. 
Similarly in State v. Mccumber, 622 P.2d 353 rut. 1980) 
the issue of the refusal to give an instruction on eyewitness 
identification was raised. With respect to that issue this 
court stated, 
A criminal defendant is entitled to have a jury 
instructed on his theory of the case if there is 
any substantial evidence to 1ust1fy such an in-
struction. Where, however, the requested in-
struction is denied, no prejudicial error occurs 
if it appears that the g1v1ng of the requested 
instruction would not have affected the outcome 
of the trial. Moreover, a defendant is not 
entitled to an instruction which is redundant or 
repetitivP of pr1nc1o}"?s ln 1 1ther 
instruct ions gi \/Pn t<, t-l1e> J '" .. /. l l1P pr tr1c ip,d 
points of defendant's propost"d instruction dealt 
with the State's burden of proof Jnd thP fJctors 
to consider in weighing the testimony of an eye 
'I'll tness. 
I .• -
All ot these factors were adequately dealt with 
presented to the Jury by 
:-1 urt . . :..s c. cr:::sult, v1e ·.:::annoc agree 
1cr.1al .J[ t'.-"-,e !..Or. 
r-,_::,.rers1f,.lr::- [footnote omitted] 
[-). L. J u. l J. 
1· t ,, L )rl\ · .l us 1 \Jfl.S tr ld t can be reached about: tOese 
1.s 1rnr::,ropPr 0r.d sho1_ild not be g1 11f'.'.?n. Secondly, 
the r·o1irt has clearly implied that under certain circumstances 
1 lPntJ t·,l instruction 1.\1ould he proper. Finally, the court 
J 1 <-.. >J.ses spoK.e in t:erms of no reversible error 
'' ting tnat due to the nature of the cases, even though 
1na·; ha·Je been error, there ·,1as no pre Judice to the appel-
1 ant- s. 
other principles of Utah law which were dealt with 
11: ·; 1 n pcissing or not mentioned at all in those cases must 
t.e discussed here. Under the law of Utah a criminal defendant 
s nnt1tled to have his theory of the case presented to the 
·ury 1n the form of written instructions, State v. Stenbeck, 
11. 350, 2 P.2d 1050 (1931), State v. Mccumber, supra. With 
to defenses, a criminal defendant is entitled to have 
JtJry instructed that the defense need only raise a reason-
loubt . state v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Ut. 1977); State 
.. __ P.2d 694 (Ut. 1980); and State v. Starks, 627 
1 j l ) . The mere fact that the court gave general 
•11s .1n t lie presumption of innocence and burden of 
.-.1 1.w·-; riot alleviate the prejudice in refusing to instruct 
.,,. ·11th i""S[Ject to tt1e defendant's burden in establishing 
r111 s court has held that a jury need not 
- iS-
go thrnuqh 5 1 lcf·J <} If I i/(Ji_J:=i r,('(>r' '-l!J1->1; 
that result. could h,::J.V"? hePn ,--:ir·l11P,1Pd l1v ,111 11 n11 
the nJ,-.-1c-::-' ·_, . 11>;: 1 ;_1, 
.2i t,_. Lt; ; (_J l )'.,-' :--, , ,,I 
In this case there '/\Jas no l.J1'/L::n 1.-Jh1.-·t1 
rPspect to a 
submitted on these issues were defendant's alternative instruc-
tions which are the subject of this appaai. 10 1 
it was error not to give an instruction explaining to the Jury 
what the defense was, and relating that portion of the evidence 
to the reasonable doubt standard. 
the giving of the Telfaire model instruction, discussed above, 
are substantial and compelling. 7hat instruction is clearlv 
a necessary and proper one and it was error to refuse to give 
it to the jury. 
The error in refusing to give the instruction on identi-
fication was prejudicial requiring a new trial. A criminal 
conviction must be reversed if there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the verdict would be different if the requested instruction 
had been given. State v. Mitcheson, 560 P.2d 1120 (Ut. 1977). 
The only issue at trial was the identification of the defendant 
as the perpetrator of the aggravated robbery. The initial des-
cription of the robber 91ven by ;•Js. Sl1eµard '11as '/Pry 'jeneral. 
She was able to describe the clothing and approximate height 
and weight of the perpetrator. The onlv d1st1nqu1sh1ng fea-
tures she noticed •,1as that of "light brown ha 1 r, snrt nf I nnq" 
10. See footnote 1, supra. 
Shepard's opportunity to observe the robber was 
,_ l . .>+ I . ine f,c,ct that much of 11ls. Shepard's obser-
at the gun is bcrne out cy the description 
·l'"''·t tn the opportunity to observe, the potential for suggestive 
µroccdures with photographic identification, the state of mind 
of Ms. Shepard at the time the observations were made and the 
of 1ny to corrcborate the identifica-
t1on of the defendant. An instruction on how to weigh the evi-
dPrire '"'""' necessary to i.nfor"l the jury of these problems. If 
the instruction had been given, there is a reasonable likelihood 
Chat the verdict would have been different. Consequently, the 
"'rror was prejudicial and a new trial should be ordered. 
CONCLUSION 
The only evidence connecting the appellant to the aggra-
•ated robbery which is the subject of this case, was the identi-
f1cat1on made of the appellant from a photographic array. The 
dangers inherent in eyewitness identification evidence have 
been recognized for many years. One of the methods that courts 
1,d"'° rc·quired to be used to eliminate some of these dangers 
' I·,. ·11 VP the Jury an instruction that describes the nature 
1.J.·11l 1f1cat1on evidence, factors to be considered in weighing 
""-'l h·ncc:: and the burden of proof that evidence must meet. 
-17-
Such an instruction ',·Jas requt::>.steiJ liE:"ft• ,ind tht- l r_-'f\JSdl tc (Jl /P 
It \JH'.::; f!r''2j1JdlC;.,i_l . t 
"i'E:JGICh, hlLh, <:." f·lE 1'(JS 
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